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Theories of the Employment Relationship: Choosing between
Norms and Contracts
MICHAEL L. WACHTER
University of Pennsylvania
The employment relationship is the construct at the heart of any industrial relations
system. Most workers are employed inside firms, and their dealings with their employer are thus
partially outside the protections offered by whatever competitive forces operate in the labor
market. This appears to leave nonunion workers without much protection against unfair
outcomes and unfair dealings to the extent that the firm has an unequal bargaining advantage.
Although there are many commentators who believe that the system works badly, it can be
argued that nonmarket mechanisms have evolved that provide substantial, if incomplete,
protection to workers. In this paper I analyze labor market theories that address this issue,
particularly how an employment relationship can work when it appears to be entirely one-sided
and stacked in favor of the firm. In so doing, I analyze the choice of norms versus contracts as a
method of forming agreements to guide the relationship and the extent to which these methods
are either self-enforcing or require judicial enforcement.1
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To address this question, it is necessary to analyze the three types of labor market
relationships that are prevalent in the economy. The first is the labor service market, an external
labor market in the sense that its activities take place outside the boundaries of an individual
firm. Within this market are very different relationships in terms of their formality, spanning the
subcontracting market at one extreme and the markets for personal services and for spot labor on
the other extreme. The second type is the employment relationship inside the nonunion firm.
This involves a firm and its employees, rather than two independent agents as in the prior case.
The third type is the employment relationship inside the union firm, which is distinct from the
prior case because of the substantial regulatory apparatus of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).2
The parties’ relationships in each of these markets are markedly different from one
another. In the labor service market, two independent parties reach an agreement to transact, that
is, to provide labor services in return for a package of terms and conditions of employment. The
terms and conditions reflect an agreement, and since the relationship is entirely voluntary, it is
assumed to represent a joint profit-maximizing point for the parties. With respect to enforcement,
these agreements are intended to be primarily self-enforcing. However, since the agreements are
contracts in the legal definition of that term, state enforcement by courts provides the ultimate
enforcement mechanism. The governance structure for the labor service market is thus
contracting based.
In the employment relationship inside nonunion firms, the agreements are frequently
determined by the firms rather than bargained over term by term by the parties. Although labor
contracting in the external market sometimes features take-it-or-leave-it terms, the nonunion
sector operates almost entirely on this basis.3 As in the labor-contracting markets, the terms are
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intended to be self-enforcing. However, unlike the former case, the terms are essentially norms
of behavior4 and thus are enforced nonlegally. Since the norms are effectively determined by the
firm, the governance structure of the nonunion employment relationship is hierarchical. There
are a few exceptions where legal enforcement is available to enforce government-mandated
terms, such as the rules governing employment discrimination, the funding of retirement plans,
and occupational safety and health.5
In the union labor market, the parties bargain over the individual terms of the contract
rather than having them be determined by the firm. Not only are the agreements legally
enforceable contracts, but the relationship between the parties is also heavily regulated by statute
in a manner quite different from the law of contracts. Of particular importance is that the
relationship is not entirely voluntary. Workers have a right to unionize, and if they do, the firm
must bargain with the union over the mandatory terms, including wages, hours, and other
conditions of employment.
Why do these very distinct forms exist? This paper provides an answer to this question. I
presuppose that the primary purpose of each of the alternative structures is to maximize the value
of the wealth available to the parties. To be successful, each of the structures has to resolve the
four key features of industrial organization theory: match-specific assets, asymmetric
information, risk aversion, and transaction costs (Rock and Wachter 1996, 1999).6 The central
question then is, How do the terms of the employment relationship work to protect the parties’
agreements with respect to the four characteristics? Are the terms of the agreement interpretable
as maximizing joint profit? Are the enforcement protections adequate?
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Historical Antecedents to the Enforcement Issue
Historically, labor market analysis addressed the bargaining process, albeit indirectly,
when it inquired whether the treatment of workers by firms was “fair” by some metric.
Typically, such inquiries have discussed the difficulties of reaching fair results given the
disproportionate bargaining power available to firms and the potential for the arbitrary use of
that power.7
Numerous reasons have been offered for workers’ not receiving their just deserts. In
discussing this question, the important distinction is between firms and markets. Some
commentators bemoan the outcomes of competitive markets that generate wages and working
conditions below what those commentators believe to be fair. But I take this line of inquiry to be
limited, given the many positive attributes associated with competitive outcomes. Moreover,
policy cannot improve on those outcomes.
A more useful approach is to criticize labor market outcomes as being noncompetitive,
which many commentators have historically done. This criticism was best captured by classical
monopsony theory; monopsony would generate equilibrium market wages that are below
competitive levels.\QQ AU: OK as edited? I don’t think you intended to say that the theory
generates low wages. XQQ\ In classical monopsony markets, individual firms exercise market
power and can set the wage below the value of the worker to the firm (Boal and Ransom 1997).
If this is the problem, the optimal solution is to make the market more competitive. Antitrust
enforcement policies that make markets more competitive, rather than monopsonistic, improve
outcomes and result in higher wages and employment.
Unions are another solution to classical monopsony. Unions raise wages above the level
that firms would voluntarily pay on their own accord. If labor markets are monopsonistic, union-
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inspired wage increases move the labor market closer to a competitive equilibrium and increase
employment. Historically, when classical monopsony theory was more popular, unions were
viewed as a procompetitive market force (Kaufman 2002; Wachter 2003). It is difficult to
maintain this position today.
Current models of monopsony recognize that the source of the upward-sloping supply
curve is labor market friction such as costs associated with recruiting and retaining workers. In
these models, it makes no sense to think of the monopsony wage as being “too low” because of
market power, and there is no reason to assume that a higher wage results in an efficiency gain
(Manning 2003). Consequently, union-inspired wage increases do not represent a countervailing
power that improves the functioning of the labor market.
The most important line of inquiry, which is at the heart of the debate over labor market
outcomes, is to focus on the problems that occur at the level of the firm, not the market. At the
firm level, a failure to achieve just deserts can potentially arise because of the very nature of the
corporate form. The corporate form creates and enforces an organizational structure of
centralized management. The corporate directors or the executive officers they designate wield
hierarchical governance powers. By design, management calls the shots in the sense of
organizing economic activity inside the firm. In the nonunion firm, centralized management
allows the firm to dictate the terms and conditions of employment and to create an enforcement
mechanism that resolves intrafirm disputes in an approved manner (Rock and Wachter 2001).
It is typically this one-sided hierarchical structure that is criticized when commentators
discuss issues of unequal bargaining power, arbitrary authority, and hierarchical governance.
Inside the firm, workers may not be adequately protected by competitive forces acting at the
market level. First, employees are asked to make commitments to their jobs, which makes them
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relatively immobile. Second, workers are likely to have less information than the employer about
labor market conditions, including the value of the worker to the firm and prevailing conditions
elsewhere in the labor market. Finally, employers can exercise their power in ways that take
advantage of workers’ lack of bargaining power. While some workers receive the optimal market
wage, others may not.
The primary policy mechanism for dealing with hierarchy inside firms has been labor
unions and the collective bargaining mechanism that they provide and champion. Unions bring
intrafirm power sharing so that both the terms of the labor agreement and the enforcement
mechanism are a result of collective bargaining, which reduces the hierarchical power of
management over labor matters. By writing enforceable collective bargaining contracts, unions
can prevent employers from exercising their power arbitrarily, harming individual workers. By
using their rights to collect information related to the collective bargaining process, unions can
equalize the information available to workers.
In analyzing these three forms, I will make use of the labor-contracting literature.8 This
literature is efficiency oriented, asking whether stylized employment practices can be interpreted
as a way of dealing with market problems such as the arbitrary use of power, informational
asymmetries, relative risk aversion, and the need to make match-specific investments. More
generally, it asks whether the observable stylized features of labor market relationships are
interpretable as the parties’ resolution of these market problems in a joint profit-maximizing
manner. In this literature, issues of fairness and unequal bargaining power are recast into
different terms with more precise meanings, namely, opportunistic behavior and asymmetric
information.
To date, the labor-contracting literature has paid little attention to the enforcement
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question. Specifically, enforcement issues are viewed as unimportant because the stylized laborcontracting arrangements are largely self-enforcing. To the extent that third parties assist in
enforcement, it is through reputational effects on other firms or workers. Judicial enforcement,
although mentioned, plays no interesting role. In this paper I pay particular attention to the
enforcement question.
The Four Factors of the Labor-Contracting Relationship
In this section I rely on the labor-contracting literature to examine how the parties
attempt to resolve problems arising from their need to make investments in their relationship
(i.e., match investments), their differences in risk aversion, asymmetric information, and
transaction costs.9
The first of the factors is investments in the relationship, that is, match-specific
investments. Investments in the match provide the basic rationale for long-term attachments
between a firm and an employee or between a contractor and a subcontractor. Effectively, the
employees or subcontractors become more valuable in their current job than they would be if
hired anew in a different job. The original explanation for this job-specific value was that such
employees had job-specific training, whether formal or learning by doing, so that their increased
productivity was a result of knowing more about how to perform the job. But in ongoing
relationships, much more is involved in making established workers more valuable than new
workers. For example, when circumstances change, an understanding of how the parties have
responded to unanticipated events can lead to a greater ability to resolve these difficulties. Many
other examples of the intuitive capital that workers attain with tenure can be given. It is best to
refer to the broader scope of knowledge and understanding as match investment rather than the
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traditional term job-specific training.
The difficulty that arises when match investments are present is the holdup problem.
Workers are worth more in their current job than they are in the external labor market. The gap
between an employee’s value on the current job and the employee’s value in the external labor
market creates a quasi rent that is subject to ex post expropriation by one party. Either party
could threaten to terminate the relationship if not given a larger share of the profits. Since matchspecific investments create value for both firms and workers, there is an efficiency gain if the
parties can make the appropriate level of investment without fear of opportunistic behavior by
the other party.
The general solution is for both parties to invest in the match so they incur sunk costs.
Once sunk costs are incurred, both parties lose if the ongoing relationship is terminated. The
result is that neither party can credibly threaten to opportunistically terminate the relationship,
since doing so would result in a loss to the threatening party. Joint investments are thus a selfenforcing agreement.
The second of the four factors is asymmetric information. Information is asymmetric
when it is relatively more costly for one of the parties to observe or monitor the quantity of
inputs or outputs, the state of technology, or product market. In order to maximize the parties’
joint profits, the information needs to be used by the parties so that they can adjust to whatever
conditions actually exist. The difficulty is that since the disadvantaged party cannot verify the
informed party’s claim, the informed party can misstate the actual information to put itself in the
best position possible. That is, the informationally advantaged party can use the power
opportunistically to improve its return, even if it means decreasing the size of the joint surplus
available to both parties.

THEORIES OF THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP: NORMS AND CONTRACTS

9

This creates a dilemma. Efficiency requires that the party with the correct information be
given the right to collect the information and to use it on behalf of the parties’ joint interests. But
how can the disadvantaged party be protected from the misuse of the information advantage?
The general solution is to restrict the channels through which the informationally advantaged
party can use the information. While the advantaged party can use and profit from its
information, it cannot do so in a manner that harms the uninformed party.
Are such mechanisms available? The answer is generally yes, although the mechanisms
may not be perfectly self-enforcing. As an example of such an arrangement, when product
market conditions are known to one party (say, the firm) but not to the other (say, the worker),
the agreement allows the firm to alter the amount of labor it purchases but not the wage rate. For
the mechanism to be self-enforcing, the firm cannot reduce the wage rate. If the firm were able to
reduce the wage rate, it could falsely claim that product demand had decreased and hence that it
needed to reduce wages to reduce labor costs. However, since demand had not declined, the firm
could maintain employment and output levels. Profits would increase because the cost of labor
would be lower as a consequence of the wage reduction. On the other hand, if the firm is forced
to reduce employment or hours of work in response to a proclaimed downturn in demand, its
output and thus its profits fall. This type of agreement is self-enforcing because the firm does not
have an incentive to misstate market conditions, as this would result in a decrease rather than an
increase in profits. Thus, the firm will not act opportunistically.
Risk aversion is the third of the four factors. Risk aversion arises when one of the parties,
typically the worker, is more risk averse than the other. Efficient risk bearing thus requires that
the workers’ returns be smoothed so that their own income is affected only by their own
performance and not by exogenous (to them) fluctuations in the revenue and profits of the firm.
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Although problems of risk aversion are partially resolved by smoothing income, there is no
perfect solution because of the problem of moral hazard. Specifically, if the worker’s return were
entirely guaranteed, the worker could reduce work effort without fearing a reduction in income.
Solving the problem of risk aversion is made difficult by the presence of asymmetric
information. Since worker’s behavior is imperfectly known to the firm, the firm cannot be
certain when the worker is shirking or the external workplace environment is adverse. The
resulting solution leaves the worker with a greater variance in income than would otherwise be
desirable.10
The solution to risk aversion points out a problem with all the self-enforcing solutions,
namely, that they are all second best in the limited sense that none would be adopted in a world
where behavior such as opportunism, asymmetric information, and moral hazard were not
present. For example, absent information asymmetries, the firm facing a decline in labor demand
might best maximize its own profits and the workers’ utility by a reduction in both hours of work
and the wage rate. Forcing the firm to make the entire adjustment through a reduction in demand
is thus second best. However, second-best solutions are not necessarily market failures that give
rise to policy improvements. Information asymmetries, potential opportunism, and moral hazard
are real economic costs just like any other economic cost, such as workers’ insistence on being
paid to work. Consequently, the self-enforcing arrangements worked out by the parties are
arguably first best, given the restricted set of solutions available to them.
Transaction costs are the costs associated with negotiating, writing, and enforcing
contracts. High transaction costs occur when the parties interact frequently, when the
interactions are connected rather than independent events, and when the environment over which
the parties interact evolves over time. These conditions are all present in an ongoing relationship.
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The greater the number of contingencies that affect the relationship over time, the greater is the
cost of contracting. High transaction costs pose a threat to the potential surplus that the
relationship can generate.
The contracting problem is exacerbated when the value at stake in each individual
contingency is low. When the transaction is a low-value event, the benefit of contracting to
protect the transaction is low, and hence even moderate contracting costs are detrimental to joint
surplus. Transaction costs are also higher the more match assets and asymmetric information in
the relationship. Match investments and asymmetric information give rise to the potential for
opportunistic behavior, and regulating this behavior requires a more detailed and hence costly
contract.
Overall, the main problem created by the high transaction costs of contracting is that they
can reduce or erase the joint surplus available from creating and maintaining the ongoing
employment relationship. It is the presence of transaction costs that make the enforcement issue
complex. If match investments, asymmetric information, and risk aversion are present but
transaction costs are low, the parties can write a complete contract. This means that every
possible future state of the world is known and addressed by the contract or that the parties can
fully allow recontracting when the environment changes. When a contract is complete, disputes
are easily resolved, since the courts can enforce the terms of the contract.
When transaction costs are high, the parties face a discrete choice. Writing contracts to
address all potential circumstances becomes costly. If the costs are high enough, the parties may
decide on an alternative mechanism for protecting the potential surplus from the relationship.
Each of the three institutional structures discussed is best suited for a very different transactioncost setting. Consequently, as I argue later, when the parties decide on how to handle transaction
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costs, they are effectively choosing an institutional structure, and since each of these structures
carries its own enforcement mechanism, the parties are also choosing among alternative
enforcement mechanisms.
The Choice of Using Markets or Firms
From the perspective of enforcement issues, the choice among alternative organizational
structures is critical. In this section, I analyze the possibly most important organizational
decision: whether to conduct the transaction inside the firm or outside the firm. To understand
the striking differences between the enforcement mechanisms protecting intrafirm and extrafirm
transactions, it is worth looking briefly at the existing theory of the firm.
Two Prevailing Models
There are two prevailing models of the firm: the property rights theory and the
transaction cost theory. Although the theories were developed separately, they are highly
complementary and, indeed, for our purposes can be viewed as a single theory. The property
rights approach focuses on the role of physical and intangible capital and posits that the core of
the firm is best defined by the physical and intangible capital over which the firms has residual
control rights. The transaction cost approach focuses more on human capital and the optimal
degree of vertical integration, that is, which labor suppliers should be brought inside the firm and
into the employment relationships and which should be left outside the boundaries of the firm. In
their respective domains, these approaches share critical assumptions and develop
complementary insights.
The critical insights shared by the two models are the need to regulate residual control
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rights and the impossibility of doing so by contract. Even in a relationship where the parties have
contracted over a number of predictable and verifiable contingencies, there will inevitably be
contingencies over which the parties cannot contract or have not contracted. Particularly in an
ongoing relationship, in which the environment evolves over time, this residual class of
contingencies can become large and can include many of the central problems facing the
relationship. By its very nature, the residual class of contingencies contains those contingencies
that make contracts very expensive to write. Consequently, any existing contract is necessarily
incomplete (Holmstrom 1999).
How then, are disputes resolved when they involve residual contingencies over which the
parties have not contracted? The answer is that one of the parties will bargain and effectively
purchase the rights of residual control. The party that purchases the residual control rights will
then use its own mechanism for resolving problems involving contested residual contingencies.
Property Rights Theory
Let us first look at the problem of residual control rights\QQ AU: OK? Else what
problem? XQQ\ from the perspective of physical (tangible) and intangible capital. The
conclusion of the property rights theory is that a firm is defined by the physical and intangible
capital over which it has residual control rights. Alternatively stated, at the core of the firm are
these residual control rights.
Take the case of the development and production of a network switch by the hypothetical
company NetSwitch. Numerous tasks need to be accomplished before the product can be
marketed. For example, machinery has to be built\QQ AU: OK? Else please confirm that you
mean that the switch-producing firm itself would not purchase the machines but rather
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that some other firm would buy them. XQQ\ to produce the switch, and if the switch is an
intermediate product, it has to be integrated\QQ AU: Cut OK? NetSwitch is producing the
switch, right, not leaving production to some other company? Or do you mean that they’d
leave the integrable design to some other firm and simply produce according to some other
firm’s design specs? XQQ\ into other equipment. Although NetSwitch may be able to do all the
tasks, it is likely that some tasks, including the two just mentioned, will be left to other firms.
More specifically, few firms fully integrate the process from production of intermediate good
through the distribution system to final consumers. In dealing with the various cooperating firms,
some rights of control are necessarily contracted away. For example, when NetSwitch deals with
the equipment seller, it may agree on specifications for the equipment and give the equipment
maker some “control” rights, such as the decision of how best to build the machine.\QQ AU:
The machine that produces the switch or the machine into which the switch is installed?
XQQ\ This major transaction is typically protected by contract. Similarly, NetSwitch may
contract with the distributor or end user of its product. Here again, certain control rights would
be transferred to the distributor or end user.
With several firms involved, ambiguities can arise as unanticipated contingencies occur.
If a contingency is unanticipated, it cannot be contracted for in advance. Who gets to decide
what happens in this circumstance? Alternatively stated, who has the control rights to resolve the
unanticipated contingent-state problems? This is the core problem that the property rights model
addresses. The solution proposed by the model is that one of the parties must buy the residual
control rights. The party that owns the residual control rights then gets to decide the outcome
when a dispute arises within the range of contingencies where the contract is incomplete (Hart
and Moore 1990).
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The “owner” of the residual control rights is best described as the owner of the asset. The
term owner usually refers to the individual or entity that gets to “call the shots.” The owner is
thus the person or entity that has the right to direct the use of the asset as long as that use does
not infringe on those rights that have previously been contracted away. The core of the firm is
thus the assets over which the firm has residual control rights. Indeed, at the core of each of the
firms in the network switch example, whether the supplier of machinery,\QQ AU: Again,
production machinery, or end-product machinery? XQQ\ the end user, or NetSwitch, are the
assets over which each of the firms has residual control rights.
If a dispute arises between parties having contractual rights to an asset, the dispute can be
referred to the courts for resolution. The threshold issue for the court to determine is whether the
dispute is over matters that are covered by the contract. If the matter is covered by the contract,
the court resolves the dispute by applying the terms of the contract. However, if the dispute
involves residual control rights that are not covered by the contract, the owner of the residual
control rights decides the dispute by fiat, that is, by exercising the power that comes with
ownership.
In my example, we can assume that NetSwitch will purchase the residual control rights
because it has the most at stake and the best overview of the switch’s potential. At the core of
NetSwitch are the residual control rights over the creation, production, and sale of the switch.
Transaction Cost Theory
The transaction cost theory is similar to the property rights theory in that it focuses on
residual control rights in a world of incomplete contracting. The difference is that the transaction
cost theory deals with labor rather than capital inputs. With this basic difference, the theory is
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otherwise remarkably similar.
The firm that owns NetSwitch\QQ AU: Is NetSwitch not the firm? Do you mean that
NetSwitch is a subsidiary of some parent firm, or do you mean the firm that owns the
network switch, that is, NetSwitch? XQQ\ will want to use labor inputs on NetSwitch’s owned
capital. The problem posed by organizing the human capital is similar to that involving the
physical and intangible capital. Some labor services can be contracted for. But here again, not all
contingencies can be anticipated and described in a contingent-state contract. Residual issues
will inevitably arise. Consequently, whereas the firm will contract for some labor services, other
labor services will be brought inside the firm.
The manner in which the parties cope with inevitable contractual incompleteness
provides the basis for a positive theory of the employment relationship and provides its
distinctiveness and differences from the labor service and collective bargaining modes.11
The theory posits that the determination of which relationships are brought inside the
firm depends on the transaction costs involved in the relationship. When transaction costs are
low, the parties can write contingent-state contracts to protect the integrity of their transactions.
Transactions can thus be left in the market, with the market providing the parties with unequaled
high-power incentives for joint profit-maximizing\QQ AU: OK? Else what is maximized?
XQQ\ behavior. In addition, the parties can rely on market information to estimate asset values
and opportunity costs. With information symmetrically available to the parties, the potential for
opportunism is reduced, and the reliability of third-party enforcement, should that prove
necessary, is increased (Williamson 1996).
Transaction costs are high in the employment relationship due to a full range of factors
such as large numbers of match-specific assets and the high degree of information asymmetry
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(Williamson, Wachter, and Harris 1975). When transaction costs are high and contract
governance is too expensive, the relationships are brought inside the firm, where they are
governed by the intrafirm hierarchical governance structure. From the perspective of transaction
cost theories, the decision to bring relationships within the firm is the decision to opt for the
intrafirm governance structure over market governance.
Central to the transaction cost approach is the use of hierarchical organizational structure
to direct the overall activity of the various components, including employees, brought inside the
firm. The hierarchy directs activity using self-enforcing rules and standards. It is this apparatus
that replaces market and legal contracts as the organizational mechanism for transacting
(Williamson 1996).
Transaction cost theories have played a larger role in labor economics and industrial
relations than property rights theories, presumably because of the focus on labor as the central
actor. However, incorporating property rights theory resolves important problems that are
present when the transaction cost model is considered alone. For example, placing control over
access to specialized nonhuman capital at the center of the theory of the firm resolves a critical
weakness with the TCE\QQ AU: Please spell out TCE. XQQ\ theory. Since employees cannot
constrain their basic right of job mobility, at least to any meaningful extent, human capital
cannot be at the core of the firm, that is, the defining feature of the firm.
What prevents the specifically skilled supplier or employee from holding up the firm
even after becoming an intrafirm employee? The property rights answer is that employees follow
the orders of the asset owner because the owner can deny continued access to the assets in which
the employee has made investments or can grant access to even more valuable assets if the
employee is a loyal and productive agent. Because the value of the specific human capital is tied
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to particular and transferable nonhuman capital, the nonhuman capital within the firm serves as
the glue for the nontransferable specific human capital (Holmstrom 1999; Rajan and Zingales
2001).
Integrating transaction cost and property rights theories also enriches our understanding
of the role of hierarchy. In the transaction cost theory, hierarchy is needed to associate the
workers with their connected, match-specific tasks. But if specifically trained workers are at the
core, why not have them own the firm and appoint a manager to act on their behalf to coordinate
them?12 The answer to this question is provided by the property rights theory. When nonhuman
capital is present, the corporate hierarchical structure comes into focus. The value of the
corporation is the free cash flow generated by the company’s physical and intangible assets. In
this model, it is the shareholders who choose the directors and, indirectly, the executive officers
who manage the business.13 Again, employees follow the directions of the hierarchy because of
the potential access it can provide to value-enhancing nonhuman capital.
The property rights theory also clears up another ambiguity present in the discussion of
asset specificity. The parties who jointly make asset-specific investments do not jointly own the
assets. One party buys the asset in the sense of buying the residual rights of control not otherwise
ceded to others by contract. The owner can then direct its use. Consequently, in our hypothetical
network switch example, when the specialized supplier remains independent, she is the owner of
the assets that create the semi-finished goods, but NetSwitch owns the residual rights of control
when it purchases her assets. Similarly, employees do not jointly own the assets in which they
and the firm make specific investments. Common ownership is inferior to sole ownership
because of the efficiency gain when the party that prizes the residual control rights most highly
gets to purchase those rights. If employees want to become residual claimants, they have to tie
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their compensation to the profits or free cash flow that the firm’s nonhuman assets can generate.
Employees do not regularly become the suppliers of capital because of risk aversion and the
nondiversification that follows when an individual has her human and nonhuman capital assets
in the same firm.
Enforcing the Arrangements of Market Players and Employment Relationship
Players
In this section, I focus directly on the contracting issue in the three different types of
organization structures: the contracting model and the employment relationship in the nonunion
firm and the union firm. In so doing, I show that the four industrial factors—match-specific
investments, asymmetric information, risk aversion, and transaction costs—largely explain the
choice of contracting mechanism. I also relate these models to the theory of the firm and the
distinction it draws between extrafirm, or market, transactions and intrafirm transactions. I
address the normative question: If the prototypical labor market problem is unequal bargaining
power and the unilateral and arbitrary use of power, how are these difficulties controlled in the
various theories? Ultimately, what is the enforcement mechanism, and how does it work?
Contract Governance in the Labor Service Market
The labor-contracting model applies to transactions between firms and between workers
and firms in the external labor market. It is the market type that has been extensively modeled by
economists since it contains few institutional features and no embedded theory of the firm. Since
labor market transactions take place outside the firm, the environment is one where transaction
costs are low compared with alternative organizational structures. The governance structure is
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contract based, and the final authority for resolving disputes is the judicial system rather than a
firm’s hierarchy.
The firm and the worker (or another firm) set out to resolve one or more of the typical
problems involving match investments, risk aversion, asymmetric information, and transaction
costs. Their agreement is codified in either an explicit or implicit agreement. As Hart (1995)
pointed out, this is essentially the principal–agent relationship, which assumes that the actors can
write a complete contract that includes appropriate penalties should anyone deviate from the
contract terms.
The contract between the parties, although enforceable in court should that be necessary,
is intended to be largely or entirely self-enforcing. This recognizes the central goal of deterring
opportunistic behavior while recognizing that enforcement costs can be large. Much of the
contracting research, in fact, focuses on the types of arrangements that have strong self-enforcing
characteristics, and it is assumed that the parties consciously choose labor contracts that have
this property.
If the self-enforcing features of contracts are strong enough to deter all opportunistic
behavior, any remaining enforcement issues are trivial. In this world, the role of third-party
enforcement is uninteresting, whether it involves private third parties or the courts and the law.
Indeed, in much of the economics literature, enforcement issues are rarely explicitly mentioned
outside the discussion of the self-enforcing features of the agreement.
However, in a complex world, self-enforcing features rarely fully protect the vulnerable
party. In this case, third-party enforcement enters the picture. Third-party enforcement includes
the role of private actors, such as other firms and potential workers. Reputational effects are
generally seen as the first line of protection should self-enforcement mechanisms fail. Contracts
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that are enforced by this method are not perfectly self-enforcing because of their reliance on
third-party effects.
Firms or employers are deterred from acting opportunistically because their bad play
would eventually be discovered by the labor market and they would suffer reputational losses
greater than their potential opportunistic gains. The opportunistically acting employer would
eventually be forced to pay higher wages in order to induce new workers to join the firm and
thus would have higher labor costs. Also, other firms might be less willing to act as customers or
suppliers of the firm because of concerns that its bad treatment of its own employees makes the
firm less generally trustworthy.
But what if judicial enforcement is required? At this point the labor-contracting literature
goes silent. However, if the contract is complete, as is typically assumed, the legal solution
remains trivial. Take the simplest case, when one party decides not to live up to the terms of the
agreement. If breach were to occur, whether intentional or inadvertent, the court’s role would be
to read the contract and enforce the agreed upon penalty. Of course, this situation rarely arises:
each party is deterred from breaching because it knows that the court will award damages to the
breached-against party.
The judicial enforcement issue becomes more interesting when the contract between the
parties is incomplete. This is also typically the boundary where the field of law and economics
interfaces with standard economics. There is extensive literature dealing with two primary
questions that frequently arise. First, what legal rules should be adopted to deal with partially
incomplete contracts resulting from unintentional gaps in the contract? Second, how should the
courts respond when contracts are largely incomplete so that there is more gap than content?
The first of these questions has largely been resolved. It is now generally accepted that
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the normatively appropriate legal response to partially incomplete contracts is to assist the
parties in their profit-maximizing goals while protecting any otherwise unprotected societal
interests. This goal is accomplished by adopting the legal rule that is efficient with respect to the
problem at hand. The general assessment of contract law is that, as a positive matter, it largely
acts in accordance with the normative goal of maximizing the surplus available to the contracting
parties. For example, contract law acts as a set of default terms that the parties can adopt by
leaving the terms unspecified or that they can overwrite with a term of their choosing (in
circumstances where externalities are not present). The result is to provide a standard-form
contract that can be adopted so as to minimize the transaction costs of contracting or to allow the
parties to adopt whatever terms satisfy their particular profit- or surplus-maximizing goals.
Consequently, when the parties omit terms, the courts fill the gaps with the default terms of
contract law.
In addition, there is widespread agreement that when a contract is inadvertently
incomplete, the court should and, in fact, does fill the gap by adopting the term that the parties
themselves would have written had they appreciated the contingency. This is an important
conclusion of the legal contract literature: the courts play the role that the labor-contracting
literature would want them to play when contracts are inadvertently incomplete. Since the gaps
are filled by terms that the parties themselves would have chosen had they known of the gap, the
resulting contract still works in a manner that maximizes the surplus available to the parties.
Consequently, even though the labor-contracting literature generally ignores enforcement issues,
the omission is not a problem because it works entirely in the spirit of the underlying literature.
For these reasons the labor-contracting literature does a good job of describing the theory
and practice of the external markets for labor services. More generally, it both describes and
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predicts what law and economics scholars call relational contracts, which are pervasive not only
in labor service markets but in many commercial markets where the agents are in a continuing,
long-term relationship.
Less attention has been paid to the second question: how to address agreements that are
primarily incomplete. What should be done when the parties intentionally leave wide gaps in
their agreement? The position consistent with this paper is that the courts’ response should be to
treat the existing contract as complete and to treat issues that arise in the gaps as not covered by
the contract.14
A simple example illustrates the point. Suppose a builder hires a self-employed laborer to
work for him for one week. The laborer meets all the criteria to qualify as self-employed. The
two agree to the laborer’s hourly wage, the hours to be worked, and the right of the laborer to
exit the relationship at will. After a few initial jobs are performed, the builder assigns the laborer
to a task that she refuses to perform. The builder responds by withholding all pay.
The laborer grieves in court, claiming that the builder breached their contract by
assigning her to the task and asks to be compensated for the time worked. Since the contract is
entirely incomplete with respect to work assignment, the court has no guidance as to how to fill
the gap. Typically, in such circumstances, the court will treat the contract as complete as to its
few terms, ruling that the work assignment is outside of the contract. Since the assignment issue
was not contracted for, it cannot be breached. However, the court will enforce the contract as to
its hourly pay term, allowing the laborer to recover for hours worked.
More generally, contract law fully protects the interests of parties to the extent that they
can do the foundational work of constructing a contract that accomplishes their goals. It is not
protective otherwise. Except in the very rare situations where the courts apply defenses such as
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unconscionability, duress, or coercion, the mission of the law of contracts is to enforce the terms
of contracts. >From the perspective of labor relations, which often sees workers as a vulnerable
class in their dealings with corporations, the law of contracts does very little to equilibrate the
power of the parties. This is one of the arguments used in the labor relations literature to defend
the statutory protection accorded unions by the NLRA.
A final relevant issue regarding the contract law of labor services is that contract case
filings and litigations are actually quite rare.15 This in part supports the ability of self-enforcing
mechanisms and private reputational effects to protect parties from opportunistic behavior. The
finding is also consistent with the idea that judicial enforcement is important as a deterrence.
Critically, however, deterrence appears to be sufficient so that the litigation costs are typically
avoided.
Litigation is expensive and wastes resources. In this sense, contract law works best if it
works at the deterrence stage. Moreover, when they cannot be resolved by the parties
themselves, disputes are often handled by alternative dispute resolution methods, including
arbitrators familiar with the parties’ relationship. Although evidence about the frequency with
which cases are litigated in this venue is sparse, the anecdotal evidence suggests that usage is
infrequent.
Norm Governance in the Employment Relationship of the Nonunion Firm
In the employment relationship in the nonunion firm, the parties rely on norms to guide
their behavior, with the firm’s hierarchical governing structure serving as the ultimate authority
for resolving disputes. The problems to be solved by the parties to the nonunion employment
relationship are similar to those found in the labor-contracting market, namely, match
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investments, asymmetric information, and risk aversion.\QQ AU: No transaction costs without
contracts? XQQ\ In much of the theoretical literature, the models do not distinguish the laborcontracting sector from the nonunion employment relationship. Since the parties are dealing with
the same types of problems, the inference is that the substantive features of the arrangements are
similar. Moreover, both sectors are assumed to be affected by reputational effects that dissuade
firms from dealing opportunistically.
There is, however, a critical difference between the contracting mechanism of the
nonunion employment relationship and that of the external labor market contract. Hierarchy
rather than contracts is used to develop the terms and conditions of employment and to dictate
the norms of behavior that will be rewarded or penalized. Should a dispute arise, the firm
dictates its resolution. Even though these terms appear to be like contract terms, the courts make
no attempt to enforce what appear to be the parties’ agreed-upon norms of behavior.
Take, for example, the paradigmatic problem when a firm discharges a worker and the
worker believes that the discharge is without cause. Should the employee take the case to court,
as she sometimes does, the courts generally apply the employment-at-will doctrine. Employment
at will stands for the principle that an employer can fire an employee for good reason, bad
reason, or no reason at all (Ehrenberg 1989). If taken literally, this rule seems to promote
opportunism.
The employment-at-will rule also appears to contradict the assertion that the courts
protect the interests of the parties. Remember that contract theory predicts and the facts suggest
that the courts will fill contract gaps using the term that the parties themselves would have
chosen. Moreover, courts will often enforce the parties’ own practices even if they are not
codified in the contract. Note that although employers seem to have enormous arbitrary
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discretion under employment at will, relatively few seem to make use of it. Instead, human
resource management preaches that firms should follow the self-enforcing norm of discharging
employees only for cause and also claims that firms generally do adopt this loftier standard of
behavior. Consequently, although one might expect the courts to adopt the discharge-only-forcause principle since it is the term generally being practiced, the courts adhere to the
employment-at-will rule. The courts’ paradoxical passive role in these intrafirm disputes is
explained by two factors: how the courts treat agreements marked by largely incomplete
contracts and the distinction between governance inside the firm as distinct from governance in
external market relationships (Rock and Wachter 1996).
If the parties to the employment relationship were to provide numerous contract terms,
the court could play the active role of filling in the gaps or applying the parties’ own norms.
Errors would be unlikely to be large because of the guidance provided by the numerous existing
terms about how the parties wished to handle similar disputes. In the employment relationship,
however, the reverse is true. The gaps are large, and there are fewer relevant existing terms. Here
the probability of judicial error is great, largely because the courts are too uninformed to make
educated guesses. And judicial error raises the costs of the parties’ relationship rather than
lowering them.
In the presence of large gaps, the helpful court points out that the dispute is not a contract
dispute because there is no contract and hence the court lacks jurisdiction. The role of the courts
in such situations is analogous to their role when they are asked to resolve a dispute when the
contract is largely incomplete. As noted earlier, in this circumstance the court narrowly draws
the four corners of the contract to include only those terms that clearly meet the conditions
required for contract formation. All other issues are assumed to be outside the contract and hence
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not accessible to judicial enforcement. In other words, the courts acknowledge and respect the
boundaries of the firm. Inside the firm, hierarchy is used is resolve disputes, not the courts. So
interpreted, the employment-at-will doctrine is a statement that the court lacks jurisdiction.
If the employer can exercise arbitrary power based on a hierarchical decision-making
process, how is the sanctity of employment agreements protected? Unequal bargaining power
would surely appear to prevail in this environment. But can or do firms exercise such arbitrary
power? The theory of the firm proves especially useful in providing an answer here. The answer
has two elements.
The first element explains why the hierarchical structure is needed. Although hierarchical
governance and centralized management can create unequal bargaining power, they also create
much of the joint surplus available to society. For centralized management to be effective, it
cannot be subject to the ultimate jurisdiction of the courts to resolve private matters. Otherwise,
judicial enforcement would undermine the legitimacy of centralized management and open
numerous disputes to judicial second-guessing. Once the parties have chosen the organizational
form, the courts respect the choice and acknowledge that the firm’s boundary is a judicial
boundary. But what then controls the acknowledged unequal bargaining power?
The second element is that while the intrafirm governance is hierarchical, it has selfenforcing features that exceed even those available in external market relationships. All of the
controls available to external market participants are at work within the firm, with the exception
of judicial enforcement. These include the strong self-enforcing features of the norms and the
reputational effects exerted by third parties. But what offsets the availability of judicial redress?
The exceptional feature of the employment relationship is that it is an intensively repeatplay market. It is this feature that provides workers with considerable bargaining power. It is
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now well known that informal norm governance works best in repeat-play situations where the
very high frequency of the interactions provides an aggrieved party the opportunities needed to
sanction and thus deter bad play (Ellickson 1991).
The reason is that self-help methods are much stronger in such situations. This is
particularly true where, as in the employment relationship, high-frequency interactions involve
information asymmetries where the employees’ day-to-day activities are imperfectly monitored.
In this situation, a firm that engages in bad play by not following the norms can be sanctioned by
the employees. In the repeat-play, low-monitoring context, the employees can engage in
techniques running from work slowdowns to outright sabotage. In this situation it is the firm that
lacks bargaining power, since the remedy—increased monitoring—can be prohibitively
expensive for the same reason that contract writing is prohibitively expensive (Rock and
Wachter 1996).
Whether the norms of the nonunion sector provide a workable resolution to the problems
of the employment relation is an empirical question. At least at this point in time, it appears that
the system does work, given the rise in the percentage of workers in this sector. Certainly,
important questions have been raised at times about some aspects of this relationship,
particularly where asymmetric information makes it difficult for employees to determine whether
the employer is actively opportunistic. Examples are the statutory interventions to regulate
employment discrimination, pension plans, and occupational safety and health. In these cases, as
was true in the earlier cases of regulation of work hours, child labor, and minimum wages, the
regulations have carved out specific areas for judicial enforcement while leaving the bulk of the
employment relationship unregulated and the firm’s hierarchical governance mechanism outside
the purview of judicial review (Bennett and Taylor 2002).
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If exclusions for government regulation prove to be an acceptable policy response to
major norm failures when they emerge, the nonunion sector can benefit from a bifurcated
enforcement mechanism that allows for very inexpensive nonunion contracting mechanisms in
all but those identifiable areas where management opportunism is most likely to occur.
Statutory and Contract Enforcement of Union Employment Relationships
The major exception to the rule of employment at will for resolving intrafirm
employment disputes is the union sector of the U.S. economy. The bargaining mechanism in the
union sector operates in a manner that can be partially predicted by the labor-contracting
literature. The employer and employees reach an agreement that covers wages and other terms
and conditions of the relationship. The provisions of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
are enforceable under contract law. Like many ongoing commercial contracts, the parties resolve
disputes by appealing to third-party arbitrators rather than relying directly on the courts. The
arbitrators apply the usual standards of contract law to the dispute at hand by interpreting the
evidence and the parties’ conduct in the context of the agreement.16
With respect to the substantive terms of the employment relationship, there are important
similarities and differences between the union sector and the two alternative structures. For
example, there is evidence that some of the adjustment patterns followed by union firms are
similar to those followed by nonunion firms and by parties in the labor-contracting market.
These include upward-sloping age–earning profiles, filling many slots through internal
promotions, and wages that are relatively inflexible with respect to downward adjustments
during periods of economic slack (Rock and Wachter 1996).
On the other hand, there is general agreement that union workers are paid considerably
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more than comparably skilled nonunion workers doing comparable work. Although the union
wage premium may have declined over the past decade, it is still material.17 On a normative
basis, the substantive terms of the CBA are thus more favorable to employees than are the
outcomes in the nonunion sector and the external market for labor services.
The greatest distinctions among these three forms, however, involve the element of
power sharing and the manner in which disputes are resolved. While the labor-contracting sector
uses contract law and the nonunion sector uses hierarchy as their enforcement mechanisms, the
union sector uses the elaborate superstructure of the NLRA that promotes power sharing. The
result is that, whereas the formation of an external labor market contract is entirely voluntary and
thus inferentially maximizes joint profits, the collective bargaining contract has numerous
mandatory features.
Under the NLRA, once the workers have chosen to be represented by a union, the firm
commits an unfair labor practice if it declines to bargain with the union in good faith over the
terms and conditions of employment. While the firm retains its hierarchical structure to
unilaterally implement changes unrelated to the employment relationship, it is constrained during
the bargaining process from unilaterally implementing\QQ AU: OK, i.e., it is limited in
making these changes? XQQ\ changes that do affect the employment relationship. In this sense
the firm loses some of its residual control rights, which, as described earlier, allow it to call the
shots. Moreover, if the parties cannot reach an agreement, they can use the economic weapons of
strikes and lockouts against each other.
Consequently, although collective bargaining contracts may maximize joint profit, there
are no legal or market forces making this so (Wachter and Cohen 1987).\QQ AU: Should this
be 1988? If not, please add to or correct year in ref. list. XQQ\ This is a very important
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distinction. The claim that contract law is efficient assumes that the parties voluntarily enter into
their relationship and bargain for terms in an atmosphere where the threat of coercion or duress
is absent and where there are few mandatory terms. The bargaining structure in the union sector
is very different from this; hence, it would be surprising for the resulting CBA to have the
welfare aspects of the unconstrained commercial contract.
An apparent negative upshot of the power sharing is that numerous disputes arise and
make the relationship highly litigious. The parties frequently litigate even minor disputes
involving the contract rights of individual workers or of management. In addition, the parties
frequently litigate “unfair labor practices,” that is, allegations that either management or the
union has violated the other’s statutory rights. Such statutory-based litigation is, of course,
entirely absent in labor service contracts in the external labor market. Moreover, while the CBA
itself is enforced under contract law, the rights established by the NLRA are enforceable under
the act, with the National Labor Relations Board serving as the court of record. The high costs of
the current collective bargaining system are without dispute (Gould 1993; Weiler 1990).
The differences in the cost of the enforcement mechanisms are even greater when we
compare union collective bargaining with the nonunion employment relationship. Remember
that the difference between the labor-contracting sector and the nonunion employment
relationship is that the latter operates without the backdrop of a judicial or third-party
enforcement mechanism and all its associated deterrence of opportunistic behavior. This makes
the nonunion enforcement mechanism even less costly than the labor-contracting mechanism.
Consequently, the cost difference in the enforcement mechanisms between the intrafirm union
and nonunion sectors is particularly large.
Costly contracting and enforcement is thus a major problem facing the union sector. Can
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enforcement be conducted so as to support the joint interests of the parties, or is it inherently
costly and adversarial? The theory of the firm and contract theory suggest a pessimistic
assessment. First, the activities performed inside firms are those for which residual control issues
are prevalent, and residual control rights involve precisely those events that are not easily
predicted before the fact and therefore cannot easily be incorporated into contracts. Second,
contract theory predicts that contracts work best when the contracting terms are largely selfenforcing and when the threat of litigation is sufficient to deter remaining possibilities of
opportunism. Finally, there are no proposals for making it less adversarial.
So why does the union sector engage in explicit contracting, and why are litigation costs
so high? There are two answers: either unions use their power to achieve noncompetitive wages
and benefits, or management cannot be trusted and acts opportunistically. To an extent, however,
the issues dovetail into one explanation.
The fact that unions can and do achieve noncompetitive benefits for their members is one
of the most widely supported economic regularities in labor market research. If unions achieve
these gains, the use of explicit contracting takes on a special role: it codifies and makes legally
enforceable the noncompetitive returns. This special role is magnified by the fact that
relationship is not entirely voluntary. A firm cannot refuse to bargain with a union that has been
certified to represent its workforce. In this context, it is likely that the unhappy party will do
whatever it can to escape from the unfavorable terms that it views as being forced on it.
The sources of the union pay premium, the wage and benefit clauses, are themselves lowcost items that generate little in the way of litigation. The payment of wages and to an extent the
payment of benefits can be observed and verified by the parties. It is the contingencies prompted
by the wage and benefit clauses that introduce litigation and increase transaction costs.
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Specifically, if the workers are being paid more than comparable nonunion workers would be
paid, the firm can be expected to engage in tactics to substitute nonunion for union labor
wherever possible or to change work rules or assignments to make the wage and benefit
premium less onerous. Given the potential scope of management activities to evade the premium,
protecting against these contingencies is a major undertaking. The result is a host of contract
clauses dealing with work assignment, discharge, relocation, subcontracting, and work rules in
general.18
This then is the contracting problem faced by the union sector. If management will search
for methods to lower labor costs, then the contract has to be elaborate enough to foreclose as
many of these as can be anticipated before they occur. This generates two well-known
contracting problems. First, management has asymmetric information about the cost and benefits
of proposed initiatives, and its information cannot be easily observed or verified by the union.
Second, the union is attempting to foresee future management initiatives that are very difficult to
predict with any accuracy. These initiatives, after all, are the very residual steps that
management itself believes it cannot contract over because of the difficulty of identifying them
beforehand. The upshot is that the union must cast a wide contracting net that constrains
management behavior over a substantial range.
Expansive contracting provisions to restrict the use of information by the informed party
render the union employment relationship less flexible, since many avenues of adjustment
normally open to managers cannot be used. Such restrictions include preventing management
from taking initiatives whose primary goal is to reduce the union’s noncompetitive advantage.
But since there is no way of verifying motive, restrictive contract terms also prevent many
changes that would maximize joint profit. Indeed, because of the verification requirement,\QQ
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AU: OK? Else please clarify “because of verification.” XQQ\ even measures that would
increase the profits of both sides may be foreclosed. This, for example, supports the widely cited
claim that nonunion automakers can pay union wages and benefits and still have lower unit labor
costs. More generally, the result of this inflexibility is to raise unit labor costs without generating
direct benefits to either the firm or the union (except for the indirect benefit of protecting the
noncompetitive results).
The second explanation for the contract morass is that management cannot be trusted and
acts opportunistically. The high litigation costs are caused by the need to constrain opportunism.
In the context of the union sector, the commentators who follow this line focus on the claim that
managers are anti-union in the sense of attempting to keep or make their plant or company
nonunion. Specifically, the pointed attacks on management’s actions in the union literature
involve the fact that management has never accepted unionization as the appropriate
organizational structure for dealing with its employees (Weiler 1990). On this claim itself there
is little disagreement. Even promanagement commentators agree that most nonunion firms
attempt to remain nonunion and that, in some cases, firms with unionized operations attempt to
become nonunion. In addition, there is broad agreement that both sides have historically used
practices that have been found to be unfair labor practices under the NLRA. Whether
management’s position is driven more by the noncompetitive agreements achieved by labor
unions or by their unwillingness to share power with unions is a topic that is beyond the scope of
this paper.
The two stories—that unions achieve noncompetitive results and that management cannot
be trusted—are thus just two elements of the same story. If unions achieve noncompetitive
results that place the firm at a competitive disadvantage in its product markets or that reduce
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shareholders’ returns below some anticipated level, then management can be expected to use
whatever mechanisms are available to it to escape from that noncompetitive position. The result
is the high litigation costs and adversarial context in which the parties often operate.
Given the disadvantages of unusually high contracting and enforcement costs, what
advantages are offered by the union form? There are two situations where collective bargaining
offers the preferred organizational structure. The first is when society wants to promote
noncompetitive results in the labor market, which was arguably the case at the time of the
passage of the NLRA (Wachter 2003; Kaufman 2002).19 The second case is when management
cannot be trusted, even absent a union wage premium. Here untrustworthy means that nonunion
managers use the hierarchical power inherent in the nonunion form to force noncompetitive
terms and conditions of employment on imperfectly mobile workers who have made match
investments and who may suffer from informational disadvantages that keep them in the dark as
to actual conditions or opportunities.
Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that when economic actors in the labor market choose a
method for organizing the provision of labor services, their choice is determined by the parties’
specific costs associated with the four problems of match-specific investments, asymmetric
information, risk aversion, and transaction costs. The costs relate to both labor and capital. The
boundaries of the firm, that is, the choice between using markets or hierarchy, are determined not
only by the costs associated with organizing labor services in these two different organizational
forms but also by the need to control the costs associated with residual rights of control over
physical and intangible assets.
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The external labor-contracting market, the nonunion employment relationship, and the
collective bargaining structure of the union sector are each likely to be cost efficient under some
economic circumstances. Two economic actors are more likely to choose the external contracting
model to guide their interests when the transaction costs of contracting are low. This is likely to
occur when the parties do not need to interact continuously, there are relatively few match
investments, and the critical information relevant to the transaction is available to both parties.
When this structure is available and markets are competitive, the parties’ interests are well
protected. Not only can they rely on the power of self-enforcing contract terms and reputational
effects, but should these fall, they can rely on judicial enforcement as well. The problems of
inequality of bargaining power and the exercise of arbitrary hierarchical powers are less
problematic in this environment because the parties are using competitive markets rather than
hierarchy to guide their activity.
Different enforcement issues arise when the activities are brought inside the firm. At least
in the nonunion firm, judicial enforcement is absent, so the parties are left to the binding powers
of the self-governing norms that they follow, augmented by third-party reputational effects that
occur when firms or workers can be labeled as bad players. Why should workers be willing to
abjure the protections of market contracting and work inside firms? The theory of the firm
provides the answer.
For capital to create value, individual firms must have residual control rights over their
key physical and intangible capital. The result is hierarchical governance whereby the executive
officers get to call the shots on behalf of the shareholders, who receive the residual income
generated by the owned assets. For hierarchical governance to work, the executive officers have
to be able to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. Even in corporation law, the
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courts give managers great discretion in conducting the business and affairs of the corporation.
Although the shareholders get to vote for the directors in their role of residual claimants, they
exercise almost no other control rights normally associated with ownership. The reason is to
protect the integrity of hierarchical governance and its ability to maximize shareholders’ value.
These same concerns devolve into the nonunion employment relationship as well.
Hierarchical governance means that the managers get to decide about employment issues with
little second-guessing by courts. Workers are willing to relinquish the protections of the external
labor market because of the increased wages available to those who are given access to valuable
nonhuman capital. In the high-transaction-cost, continuous-interaction setting of the employment
relationship, match-specific investments are frequent, and asymmetric information problems are
endemic.
For the firm to be successful, it has to decide on the capital stock over which it needs to
have residual control. In the nonunion sector, the firm also decides on the norms and specific
standards of the employment relationship. Both the firm and its workers have much at stake in
making their relationship work. The success of the nonunion sector of the economy suggests that
the system must be working, at least tolerably and perhaps much better than that. There is still
inequality of bargaining power, which is inherent in the system. But it is at least arguable that the
norm-based governance system, policed by the ability of either party to penalize\QQ AU: As
intended? XQQ\ bad play in the transaction-intensive relationship, works reasonably well
(Rock and Wachter 2001).
But a hierarchical, norm-based system may not always work. Although the firm has the
appropriate incentives to treat workers fairly, the managers may not act this way because of
either individual managers’ idiosyncratic behavior or firm policy. When this occurs, workers can
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seek the heightened protections of the NLRA, whereby the contract formation process itself is
protected by contract law and the union certification and collective bargaining processes have
distinct statutory protections.
Alternatively, government labor market regulation—narrowly targeted to resolve specific
intrafirm problem areas such as employment discrimination, pension regulation, and
occupational safety and health—can reduce the need for unions. By carving out problem areas
and resolving them while leaving hierarchical governance in place, policy has made the
nonunion form much more successful than it otherwise would likely have been (Bennett and
Taylor 2002).
The collective bargaining system was originally envisioned to serve the needs of a wide
spectrum of workers, not just those dissatisfied with the nonunion sector. Collective bargaining
was viewed as a good in itself. However, if collective bargaining is a good, it is an expensive
one. The theory of the firm teaches that the hierarchical, norm-based system that eschews
contracts and legal enforcement is the low-cost contracting and enforcement mechanism to be
used inside firms. The nonunion system has many cost advantages over the union system as long
as management opportunism can be adequately controlled by self-enforcing mechanisms
combined with reputational effects. If this nonunion system works—in the sense that workers
feel adequately protected by it against firm opportunism—then the union alternative is likely to
be at a material disadvantage.
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Notes
1

A term of an agreement is self-enforcing if none of the parties to the agreement would

find it profitable to use the discretion available to them to redistribute profits to themselves.
Agreements that self-enforce thus do not require or benefit from either judicial enforcement or
even from private, third-party effects such as reputational effects.
2

Throughout this article, I refer to the National Labor Relations Act as the regulatory

mechanism for protecting unionized workers. Of course, other federal and state laws are also
involved in regulating the collective bargaining mechanism (e.g., the Railway Labor Act).
3

The fact that one party may dictate contract terms to another does not imply that the

terms are unfair. The contract terms may entirely or partially reflect competitive market
pressures, and the lack of bargaining over the terms may merely reflect the parties’ desires to
reduce contracting costs (Posner 2003).
4

See Rock and Wachter (1996). For my purposes, a useful definition of norms is “rules

or standards enforced solely by private (i.e., nonstate) actors.” The term describes what the
parties actually do and is not intended to have any normative content. See, for example,
Ellickson (1991).
5

In addition, the employer and individual employees sometimes write enforceable

contracts governing major one-time events such as starting pay, severance pay, or restrictions on
competing with the company should the employee quit.
6

An asset is match specific if an alternative user can redeploy it only with substantial

sacrifice of productive value. An asset is general when there exists a ready secondary market so
that the asset can be sold at approximately the firm’s current use value. Asymmetric information
exists when it is relatively more costly for one of the parties to observe or monitor the quantity of
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inputs or outputs, the state of technology, or the product market. Risk aversion exists when an
individual views risk as bad and is willing to take a lower return or benefit in order to reduce the
risk that she faces. Transaction costs refer to the costs of organizing the activities of the inputs
and outputs.
7

Some argue that the efficiency argument is circular. If markets are competitive and

workers have choices and can contract freely, then reasonably efficient outcomes will result from
the freedom of contract. The problem, according to these commentators, is that workers cannot
contract freely, have limited information and limited choices because they are weak in
comparison with the firm, and cannot protect themselves. If one assumes this to be true, the
collective bargaining apparatus of the union employment relationship would be favored over the
nonunion employment relationship (Atleson 1983; Gould 1993; and Weiler 1990).
8

The economics literature on self-enforcing labor market contracts is extensive. See, for

example, Carmichael (1989), Lazear (2000), and Gibbons (1998).
9

This section draws from Wachter and Wright (1990) and Rock and Wachter (1996,

1999).
10

This is the efficiency wage problem, whereby increases in wages above competitive

levels are actually profit enhancing because they lower monitoring costs by more than the wages
increase costs (Ackerlof and Yellon\QQ AU: Yellen in ref. list. Which spelling is correct?
XQQ\ 1986).
11

The transaction cost theory of the firm was first introduced by Coase (1937) and was

developed to its current state by Williamson (1975) and others working in that tradition. For a
discussion of its implications for labor market contracting, see Rock and Wachter (1996).
12

Such a structure exists and is quite prevalent in some sectors. It is the partnership
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model in which the partners essentially run the company and all decisions are made by a vote of
a majority of the partners unless otherwise specified in the partnership agreement.
13

The related question is why do the shareholders get to vote for the directors and not the

employees, or, alternatively, why not both the shareholders and employees? The answer again
turns on residual rights. Only the shareholders are the residual claimants, and thus they alone
have the appropriate incentives to maximize the value of the firm.
14

According to Schwartz (1992), the courts in general do respond in this fashion.

15

Moreover, this is true for contract law overall. See Galanter (2001).

16

The range of the collective bargaining agreement is also predicted by contracting

theory. Wages, nonwage benefits, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment are
covered. Moreover, contracts almost never materially limit the employer’s ability to direct the
firm through capital expenditure decisions or other nonlabor issues.
17

There is considerable evidence that unions succeed in achieving a wage and benefit

premium, that is, wages and benefits above those paid to comparable workers in the nonunion
sector. See, for example, Hirsch and Addison (1986), Kaufman (in press), and Linneman and
Wachter (1986). Although there is a claim that unions raise productivity and that the premium is
paid out of noncompetitive profits, there is little evidence to support this claim.
18

It is difficult to empirically verify the effects of contract restrictions on the flexibility

of managers to adjust to changing circumstances. This reflects the difficulties of modeling the
specific effects of particular contract restrictions. However, there is considerable evidence on the
effects of unions on firm profitability. See, for example, Rubak\QQ AU: Ruback in ref. list.
Which spelling is correct? XQQ\ and Zimmerman (1984) and Hirsch (1997).
19

During the 1930s, the industrial public policy goal was “stabilizing business” or
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avoiding “excessive competition,” which was understood to mean restricting competition. In this
context, unions were viewed as a positive force: a countervailing power to that exercised by
corporations (Wachter 2003).
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